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Attorney for Defendant

MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE LOS ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)

Plaintiff, ) No.

-v- ) DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT
) (Section 647(b)P.C.)

FABIAN FARNIA, )

Defendant. )

Now comes the defendant and demurs to the complaint charging him with a violation of subdivision (b) of Section 647 of the California Penal Code, i.e., soliciting for an act of prostitution. The defendant asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction to

The defendant asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed in this matter, other than to hear and decide the demurrer, for the following reasons:

- 1. This subdivision is unconstitutionally vague in that the definition of "prostitution" is dependent on the meaning of the term "lewd."
- 2. This subdivision is unconstitutionally vague in that the definition of "prostitution" is dependent on the meaning of the phrase "or other consideration."
- 3. This subdivision is unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the state and federal constitutional protections of freedom of speech in that it prohibits all requests to engage in sex for a consideration regardless of whether the request is made in public or in private, is discreet or offensive, or whether the parties are strangers or intimates,

whether the consideration is commencial or social, whether the sexual acts suggested would be performed for recreational or theraputic reasons, or whether the consideration is for a lawful or an unlawful act.

- 4. The state and federal constitutions guarantee each person the right to privacy. Persons above 18 years of age have the right to engage in consenting sexual activity in California, so long as that activity occurs in private. It is a violation of that right to privacy to restrict the right to offer or receive any form of consideration for such legal activity. As a result subdivision (b) is unconstitutional.
- 5. This section is further violative of the right to privacy and is overbroad in that it infringes on the rights of patients undergoing psychological treatment to participate in therapy involving the use of sexual surrogates who are paid a fee for participating in such therapy. This section infringes on the decision of both the doctor and the patient in that it prohibits the use of paid sexual surrogates even though this may be the recommended form of therapy.
- 6. Sex is a basic right guaranteed by the state and federal constitutional provisions of freedom of speech, right to privacy, life and liberty under the due process clauses, and other rights reserved by the people under the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 647(b) violates these provisions by prohibiting sex for a consideration under any and all circumstances, without a compelling state interest.
- 7. By denying sex for any consideration, Section 647(b) is violative of the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions in that such a restriction is arbitrary, unreasonable and irrational.
- 8. Section 647(b) is violative of equal protection under the state and federal constitutions in that the state allows persons over 18 to engage in any form of consenting sex in private and to solicit for such conduct, but 647(b) deprives persons of the right to engage in such conduct or solicite for

such conduct if any form of consideration is involved. This deprives persons of engaging in private sexual conduct who can not find sexual partners without offering some form of consideration, thus condemning such persons to lives of celibacy; there is no rational state interest in forbidding the offering of consideration by such a person when the offer is made in private to another consenting adult.

- 9. Section 647(b) violates the constitutional doctrine of Separation of Church and State in that there are no independent secular purposes for the proscription contained in the section, and the acts are not malum in se; the only basis for such a sweeping prohibition is historical religious law.
- of equal protection in that it allows a conviction to be based upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness. The general solicitation statute which prohibits soliciting a crime, namely, Section 643(f) P.C., requires either two witnesses or one witness and other corroborating circumstances. Section 647(b) does not have any such safeguard, and there is no rational justification for the distinction.

For the foregoing reasons, any one of which is sufficient, the defendant requests that this court sustain the demurrer.

DATED: November 13, 1979

THOMAS F. COLEMAN